Perceptual sensitivity is modulated by what others can see by Seow, T & Fleming, SM
Perceptual sensitivity is modulated by what others can see
Tricia Seow1,2 & Stephen M. Fleming1,3
# The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
Previous work has established that social cues such as the direction of others’ gaze or their perspective on a scene may influence
one’s own perceptual judgments. However, up until now it has remained unclear whether such influences are exerted at a
perceptual or decisional locus, as most previous studies have used response times as their primary dependent measure. Here,
we asked whether perceptual sensitivity is also dependent on social cognition. To test this hypothesis, we asked participants to
evaluate whether low-contrast Gabor patterns embedded in noise were visible from either their own or an avatar’s perspective.
Across three experiments, we found that observers’ detection performance was increased if an avatar also shared perception of the
stimulus location. By leveraging signal detection modelling, we show that this effect is driven by a change in perceptual
sensitivity (d′), independent of decisional or response interference. Furthermore, by Bblindfolding^ the avatar, we show that
the boosting effect of shared perception on detection sensitivity is only obtained when the participant believes the avatar can also
see the stimulus, ruling out an influence of low-level directional cues. We interpret these results within a framework in which the
avatar’s perspective boosts top-down spatial attention by prioritising particular spatial locations at which perception is shared. In
summary, we reveal that perceptual sensitivity is modulated by the perspective of others.
Keywords Attention . Bayesianmodeling . Signal detection theory
Whether a stimulus is consciously perceived is determined by
the strength of sensory processing and top-down factors such
as expectations and attention (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011;
Summerfield & Egner, 2009). Signal detection theory (SDT)
provides a framework for decomposing perceptual perfor-
mance into two statistics: d', the sensitivity of the system to
signal occurrence in signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) units, and an
overall bias to report signal presence, modelled as the criteri-
on, c (Green& Swets, 1966;Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). It
is well established that simple attentional cues predicting
behaviourally relevant spatial locations lead to increased
sensitivity (Carrasco, Ling, & Read, 2004; Müller &
Findlay, 1987; Wyart, Nobre, & Summerfield, 2012). In par-
allel, previous work has shown that social cues such as the
direction of others’ gaze or their visual perspective on a scene
can influence one’s own judgments and decisions (Cole,
Smith, & Atkinson, 2015; Furlanetto, Becchio, Samson, &
Apperly, 2016; Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson, 2010; Samson,
Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010;Wiese,
Wykowska, Zwickel, &Müller, 2012). For instance, when the
number of stimuli visible to the subject and an avatar are in
conflict, response times to verify the number are slowed
(Samson et al., 2010). However, it remains unknown whether
sharing perception of a scene with others affects perceptual
sensitivity, as most previous studies of visual perspective-
taking have used response times (RTs) as their primary depen-
dent measure.
Here we asked whether perceptual sensitivity is also depen-
dent on the perspective of others. In other words, when
looking at a sunset with a friend, is the sunset perceived dif-
ferently than if you were alone? Or, more prosaically, are you
more likely to detect a target if your co-observers can see it
too? To answer this question, we manipulated whether a vir-
tual avatar did or did not share the participant’s view of low-
contrast Gabor patterns embedded in noise (see Fig. 1a). On
each trial, the Gabor was either congruent (visible to both the
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avatar and the participant), incongruent (not visible to the
avatar, but visible to the participant), or absent. Before the trial
began, participants were cued to report the visibility of the
Gabor from either their own (Bself^) or the avatar’s (Bother^)
perspective. Although criterion shifts cannot be unequivocally
tied to a perceptual or decisional locus (Morgan, Hole, &
Glennerster, 1990; Witt, Taylor, Sugovic, & Wixted, 2015),
changes in sensitivity are typically modelled as changes in
signal-to-noise ratio, indicating selective effects on visual per-
ception independent of response biases (Green & Swets,
1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Witt et al., 2015).
We used the same paradigm, with slight modifications,
across a series of three experiments. In all experiments, the
contrast of the target Gabor was titrated for each individual
participant to achieve ~70% detection accuracy in an initial
thresholding session (see Experiment 1, Method, for details),
and subsequently kept constant throughout the experiment. To
facilitate SDT analysis, in all experiments we excluded sub-
jects who performed <60% or >90% correct in the critical
Bself^ condition from further analysis (see Experiment 2,
Method). Our key findings nevertheless hold when all sub-
jects are included (see Supplementary Materials).
Fig. 1 a Experimental design and stimuli. On each trial, subjects were
cued as to which perspective they should adopt for that particular trial. A
male avatar oriented to one or the other half of the room then appeared,
followed by briefly presented low-contrast Gabor(s)/noise patch(es).
Participants were asked to judge whether a Gabor could be seen from
the relevant perspective (BHim^ or BYou^) with a button press. Gabors
are indicated with dashed purple circles, and noise patches with dashed
orange circles, neither of which were present in the experiment. In
Experiment 1, either two noise patches or one noise patch and one
Gabor were presented. Examples of trials in the different experimental
conditions are shown in the inset: Congruent = the Gabor was visible to
both the avatar and observer; Incongruent = the Gabor was visible to the
observer, but not the avatar; Absent = only noise patches were presented,
and thus congruency was not defined. In all panels, the background is
cropped and stimuli enlarged for presentation purposes. b Visual
detection performance in Experiment 1. Each panel indicates the accuracy
and response times of visual detection judgments sorted by condition.
Symbols indicate the significance of paired t tests (*p < .05.
**p < .01. ***p < .001). Error bars indicate SEM (N = 10)
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The extent to which the avatar’s perspective interferes with
participants’ perceptual sensitivity was estimated by analysing
performance on the critical Bself^ trials. Our central hypothe-
ses focus on differences between congruent and incongruent
trials within the Bself^ condition (when the avatar’s perspec-
tive is irrelevant for the observer’s decision) to investigate
whether visual detection is affected by the perspective of
others. We also conducted exploratory analyses to understand
the pattern of results obtained in the Bother^ condition. We
report these in a separate results section before the General
Discussion.
In Experiment 1, we explore the effect of sharing percep-
tion with the avatar on visual detection. In Experiment 2, we
modified the design to allow SDTanalysis to separately quan-
tify the influence of the avatar on changes in perceptual sen-
sitivity and the criterion for detection. Lastly, in Experiment 3,
we demonstrate that the effect of the avatar on perceptual
sensitivity is underpinned by beliefs about shared perception
rather than reflecting the influence of low-level directional
cues.
Experiment 1
Method
Power simulations Previous work utilising classic dot per-
spective tasks investigating the effect of self and other per-
spectives on judgements of explicitly visible stimuli reported
a very large main effect of congruency on response times, F(1,
15) = 45.51,MSE = 2,127.31, p < .001, η2p = 0.752 (Samson
et al., 2010). This effect size suggests that only ~N = 4 is
required to achieve 95% power. However, as our study uti-
lized novel near-threshold stimuli and perceptual sensitivity
measures with unknown effect sizes, we decided to collect
data from a larger pool of ~N = 20.
Participants Participants across all three experiments had nor-
mal or corrected-to-normal vision, recruited from the
University College London (UCL) psychology subject pool
and provided informed consent. The study was approved by
the UCL Research Ethics Committee.
Nineteen participants (16 females, mean age = 27 years, SD
= 9.13, range: 19–53 years) took part in Experiment 1. We
excluded any participant for whom mean accuracy on Bself^
trials was >90% or <60% correct to avoid ceiling/floor effects
on detection performance. Nine participants were excluded,
leaving 10 for analysis (seven females; mean age = 27.6 years,
SD = 7.91, range: 20–41 years).
Stimuli and procedure The background and avatar were gen-
erated with the three-dimensional animation software Blender
(Version 2.76; https://www.blender.org/) and stimulus
presentation was controlled by Cogent 2000 and Cogent
Graphics (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php) in
MATLAB (The MathWorks, Natick, MA).
Experimental stimuli were either noise patches or Gabor
patches (a circular patch of sinusoidal light and dark bars).
Noise patches consisted of randomly generated white noise at
10% contrast and modulated by a Gaussian envelope. Gabor
patches consisted of sinusoidal gratings (spatial frequency of
five cycles per degree, orientation 30 degrees), superimposed
with 10% white noise and modulated by a Gaussian envelope.
Both Gabors and noise patches subtended ~3 degrees of visual
angle, and were presented at an eccentricity of ~4.5 degrees.
Gabor contrast was determined as described below, and all
luminance increments were gamma corrected. Subjects were
asked to press either the up key on a standard keyboard if the
Gabor was visible from the relevant perspective, or the down
key if it was absent.
Participants were seated approximately 60 cm away from a
Dell Latitude E5550 series laptop running at a resolution of
1,024 × 768 pixels and situated in a darkened room. Prior to
the start of the main experimental session, Gabor contrast (the
luminance difference between light and dark bars) was cali-
brated for each individual participant using the QUEST pro-
cedure (Watson & Pelli, 1983) to estimate a Gabor contrast
that yielded 70% correct performance in a two-interval forced-
choice task. Three independent threshold estimates were ac-
quired, with 40 randomly ordered trials contributing to each.
The mean value of these threshold estimates was used to set
the contrast of the Gabor in the main experiment, which then
remained constant.
In the main experiment, the background consisted of a
slightly elevated frontal view of a 3-D room with a grey back
wall split by a white divider. A male human avatar was posi-
tioned in the centre of the screen looking forwards into the
room, either to the left or right side of the divider. Each trial
began with a fixation cross presented for 500 ms (see Fig. 1).
The word BYOU^ or BHIM^ was then shown for 750 ms,
indicating which perspective (Bself^ or Bother^, respectively)
participants should take for that particular trial. The avatar
then appeared for 500 ms followed by stimuli superimposed
on the grey wall of the room for 300 ms. Participants then
indicated with a button press whether a Gabor was present
(BYes^ or BNo^ response) from the perspective they were
instructed to adopt in that particular trial.
In Experiment 1, stimuli composed of either two noise
patches (Gabor-absent trials) or one noise patch and one
Gabor patch (Gabor-present trials). Participants performed
four blocks of 100 trials in a factorial design crossing perspec-
tive = self/other, avatar direction = left/right, stimulus position
= left/right and Gabor = present/absent. As two noise patches
were presented on Gabor-absent trials, we were unable to
define a stimulus position for Babsent^ trials. Trial order was
randomised.
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Congruency refers to the relationship between Gabor loca-
tion and avatar direction. Trials were labelled as congruent if
Gabor location was the same as avatar direction (as both the
participant and avatar were able to see the Gabor; a shared
perspective) and incongruent if the Gabor location was not
the same as avatar direction (i.e., the Gabor was only visible
to the participant). Thus, there were three conditions in
Experiment 1: congruent (where the avatar could see the
Gabor), incongruent (where the avatar could not see the
Gabor) and absent (only noise patches presented, and congru-
ency is undefined). The three conditions of Experiment 1 are
illustrated in Fig. 1a.
The correct response as to whether a Gabor was visible for
each trial thus depended on the cued perspective, Gabor pres-
ence and congruency for that trial. For instance, if the partic-
ipant sees the word BYOU^ (Bself^ condition; they should
take their own perspective), the avatar is irrelevant for the
response in this condition as the participant is able to see the
Gabor regardless of where it appears relative to the dividing
wall. Thus in a Gabor-present trial, they should indicate that a
Gabor was present (BYes^ response), while in a Gabor-absent
trial, they should indicate that a Gabor was absent (BNo^
response).
However, if the participant sees the word BHIM^ (Bother^
condition; they should take the avatar’s perspective), the ava-
tar is important for determining the response in this condition
as the avatar is only able to Bsee^ the Gabor on the same side
of the wall to where he is looking. Thus, in Gabor-present-
congruent trials, the participant should indicate that a Gabor is
present from the avatar’s perspective (BYes^ response). In
contrast, if a Gabor appears on the side opposite to where
the avatar is looking (incongruent trials) or is absent, they
should indicate that a Gabor is absent from the avatar’s per-
spective (BNo^ response).
Data preprocessing Response times (RTs) were measured
from stimulus onset. Individual trials were excluded from
analysis if log response times were in excess of three standard
deviations of the participant’s mean log(RT). A mean of 3.9
trials per subject were excluded.
Results
In Experiment 1, we analysed data fromN = 10 observers who
reported whether near-threshold Gabor patches were visible
from either their own or an avatar’s perspective (see Fig. 1).
Critically, on Gabor-present Bself^ trials, participants were
more likely to successfully detect the Gabor when it was also
visible to the avatar (leftmost bars of Fig. 1b), t(9) = 4.78, p <
.001. To further quantify the effect of congruency and per-
spective type on behavioural performance, we performed a 2
× 2 repeated-measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) on re-
sponses to Gabor-present trials with congruency (congruent/
incongruent) and perspective type (self/other) as within-
subjects factors. We found a significant Congruency ×
Perspective interaction,F(1, 9) = 14.85, p < .001, for accuracy,
due to a shared perspective boosting detection on Bself^ but
not Bother^ trials. Effects on detection accuracy were obtained
in the absence of changes in response time, suggesting a lack
of decisional or response interference (see Fig. 1b, right
panel): There were no response-time main effects of congru-
ency, F(1, 9) = 2.77, p = .13, perspective; F(1, 9) = 3.08, p =
.11; or a Congruency × Perspective interaction, F(1, 9) =
0.163, p = .70, for Gabor-present trials. Gabor-absent trials
also showed no effect of perspective on response time, t(9) =
1.24, p = .25. Taken together, these results indicate that visual
detection performance on critical Gabor-present Bself^ trials is
boosted by shared perception.
Discussion
We reasoned that the effect of the avatar on visual detection
observed in Experiment 1 may be due either to a change in
response bias (an increased tendency to report Gabor presence
at locations viewed by the avatar, irrespective of the stimulus
condition), an increase in perceptual sensitivity, or both. It was
not possible to discriminate between these alternatives in
Experiment 1, because congruency was undefined for
Gabor-absent trials in which a pair of noise patches was al-
ways presented. Additionally, while we aimed to collect data
from N = 20 subjects, the QUEST calibration procedure was
not as precise as we had hoped. As such, several participants
deviated from the target accuracy in the main experiment
resulting in a relatively small sample size after exclusion
criteria were applied.
To evaluate the possibilities outlined above and to replicate our
initial findings in a larger sample, we carried out a second exper-
iment (N = 18, after exclusions) in which a single noise patch or
Gabor was presented on either side of the central dividing wall.
This design alteration allowed congruency to be defined on both
Gabor-present and Gabor-absent trials (i.e., a noise patch that was
either visible or invisible to the avatar), permitting calculation of
the effect of the avatar’s perspective on both hits (BYes^ responses
when the Gabor was present) and false alarms (BYes^ responses
when the Gabor was absent).
Experiment 2
Method
Participants Twenty-nine participants (20 females, mean age =
24 years, SD = 6.53, range: 18–52 years) took part in
Experiment 2. Eleven participants were excluded with the
same exclusion criteria as Experiment 1, leaving 18 for
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analysis (15 females; mean age = 22.6 years, SD = 4.38, range:
18–37 years).
Stimuli and procedure We used the same stimuli and proce-
dure as in Experiment 1, except that only one stimulus (either
a noise patch or Gabor patch) was presented on each trial.
Participants again performed four blocks of 100 trials in a
fully factorial design crossing perspective = self/other, avatar
direction = left/right, stimulus position = left/right and Gabor
= present/absent.
In contrast to Experiment 1, stimulus position was now
relevant on both noise trials (when a single noise patch was
presented) and signal trials (when a Gabor patch was present-
ed), which was crucial to allow a factorial analysis of sensi-
tivity. Thus, congruency referred to the relationship between
stimulus location (Gabor or noise patch) and the direction the
avatar is looking. There were four conditions for Experiment
2: Gabor-present congruent (avatar could see the Gabor),
Gabor-present incongruent (avatar could not see the Gabor),
Gabor-absent congruent (avatar could see the noise patch) and
Gabor-absent incongruent (avatar could not see the noise
patch; see Fig. 2a).
Data preprocessing Data of Experiment 2 were preprocessed
in the same way as for Experiment 1. A mean of 3.4 trials per
subject were excluded.
Signal-detection analysis Responses on Bself^ trials were
sorted into hits, false alarms, misses, and correct rejections
(this analysis was not applied to Experiment 1, as it was not
possible to determine congruency on Gabor-absent trials). For
each subject, detection sensitivity (d') and criterion (c) were
calculated separately for congruent and incongruent trials as
follows:
d
0 ¼ z Hð Þ−z FAð Þ
c ¼ −0:5 z Hð Þ þ z FAð Þ½ 
where z indicates the inverse of the cumulative normal distri-
bution, H is the hit rate, and FA is the false-alarm rate. We
additionally fitted a hierarchical Bayesian signal detection
model (Lee, 2008) to obtain posterior distributions of group-
level sensitivity and bias parameters. We used Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) as implemented in JAGS in R
(Plummer, 2003) to draw samples from the posterior distribu-
tions. JAGS was called with 2,000 adaptation steps, 5,000
burn-in samples and 50,000 effective samples. Three chains
for each parameter were run, and convergence of all chains
was assessed both visually and using Gelman and Rubin’s
potential scale-reduction statistic R^ for all parameters
(Gelman & Rubin, 1992). Large values of R^ indicate conver-
gence problems and values ~1 suggest convergence. Average
R^ was 1.00, and all values were <1.1, indicating good
convergence. We fitted the model described in Lee (2008)
twice, once for each of the congruent and incongruent
conditions.
The posterior distributions of each parameter returned by
JAGS can be straightforwardly employed for Bayesian infer-
ence (Kruschke, 2014). For example, to assess the difference
between two conditions, congruent and incongruent, we can
directly calculate the probability that the difference between
the two parameters is larger than zero,
Pθ d
0
congruent−d
0
incongruent > 0
 
, where a high probability indi-
cates strong evidence in favour of a difference. We denote
these probabilities as Pθ to distinguish them from classical
p values.
Results
Participants were again more likely to successfully detect the
Gabor when it was also visible to the avatar on Bself^ trials
(see Fig. 2b), t(17) = 3.63, p = .002, with no change in re-
sponse time, t(17) = −0.90, p = .38, thereby replicating our key
finding from Experiment 1. Classical paired t tests revealed
that congruent (vs. incongruent) avatar perspectives boosted
d', t(17) = 2.35, p = .03, and led to a more liberal criterion,
t(17) = −3.53, p = .003. Examination of hit and false-alarm
rates showed that this effect was due to a selective increase in
hit rate on congruent trials, t(17) = 3.63, p = .002, in the
absence of any change in false-alarm rate, t(17) = 0.98, p =
.34 (see Fig. S1 in the Supplementary Materials). As in
Experiment 1, no significant effects of condition were ob-
served on response times between Bself^ congruent and incon-
gruent trials, t(17) = −0.57, p = .57 (see Fig. 2b). However, in
this case an ANOVA revealed significant main effects of con-
gruency, F(1, 17) = 7.54, p = .01; perspective, F(1, 17) =
38.13, p < .001; and a Congruency × Perspective interaction,
F(1, 17) = 11.88, p = .003, due to faster responses on Bother^
incongruent trials.
We additionally fitted a hierarchical Bayesian signal-
detection model to all subjects’ data to obtain group-level
posterior distributions of sensitivity (d') and criterion (c) sep-
arately for congruent and incongruent Bself^ trials (see
Experiment 2, Method). We compared group-level posteriors
using a Bayesian approach that returns a probability in support
of the alternative hypothesis (Kruschke, 2014), which we de-
note as Pθ to distinguish it from a classical p value. This
analysis revealed effects of shared perception on both percep-
tual sensitivity and detection criterion (see Fig. 2C and
Supplementary Materials’ Fig. S7; both Pθs > .99). Taken
together, the results of Experiment 2 indicate a selective in-
crease in perceptual sensitivity is obtained when the avatar’s
perspective is aligned with that of the participant (results on
Bother^ trials are presented in a separate section below).
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Fig. 2 a Design and stimuli of Experiment 2 were similar to Experiment
1, except that only one stimulus was presented on each trial (either a noise
patch or a Gabor, to the left or right of the divider). Examples of trials in
the different experimental conditions are shown in the inset; congruency
is now defined for both Gabor-absent and Gabor-present trials, as only
one noise patch was presented on each Gabor-absent trial. In all panels,
the background is cropped and stimuli enlarged for presentation purposes.
bMean accuracies and response times in Experiment 2, plotted using the
same conventions as in Fig. 1b. cMean d′ and criterion for the Bself^ trials
as well as posterior densities of the difference between congruent and
incongruent conditions for perceptual sensitivity (d′) and bias (criterion).
The change in colour indicates where the distribution crosses the zero
point. Symbols indicate the significance of paired t tests (*p < .05.
**p < .01. *** p < .001). Error bars indicate SEM (N = 18)
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Discussion
We next considered whether the effects of the avatar on
perceptual sensitivity on Bself^ trials could be due to low-
level directional cues rather than beliefs about shared per-
ception (Heyes, 2014). For instance, simply by being ori-
ented to one or other side of the room, the avatar may act
as a directional cue towards congruent Gabors (Driver
et al., 2010; Guzzon, Brignani, Miniussi, & Marzi,
2010; Posner, 1980). Such directional cueing may occur
in the absence of any assessment of whether the avatar
can or cannot see the stimulus. Following Heyes (2014),
we reasoned that if the effect of the avatar on visual de-
tection was only due to a directional cue, it would remain
intact if the avatar’s directional features were maintained,
but he was unable to see due to being blindfolded (see
Fig. 3a). If, on the other hand, the effects observed in
Experiments 1 and 2 were mediated by shared perception
of the stimulus, they should be abolished when the avatar
is unable to see. In a new cohort of participants (N = 37),
we extended the design of Experiment 2 such that on half
the trials the avatar was blindfolded, resulting in a 2 (self,
other) × 2 (blindfold, no blindfold) × 2 (congruent, incon-
gruent) experimental design (see Fig. 3a).
Experiment 3
Method
Power simulations To ensure that Experiment 3 was well
powered despite the added complexity of the design, we car-
ried out SDT simulations of our experimental hypothesis that
the effect of congruency would only be obtained on seeing
trials. First, we drew values of baseline d' and criterion from
the group-level posterior of the baseline parameters from
Experiment 2. For each run of the simulation, this draw was
assigned to the conditions congruent/nonseeing, incongruent/
nonseeing, and incongruent/seeing. To create the increased d'
and more liberal criterion expected in the congruent/seeing
condition, we drew a sample from the posterior of the differ-
ence between congruent and incongruent conditions in
Experiment 2, and added this to each baseline parameter.
SDT parameters for each condition were then used to
generate hit and false-alarm counts from a binomial ob-
servation model with 96 trials per condition, and the ob-
served d' and criteria were calculated. This procedure was
repeated for each simulated subject, and a repeated-
measures ANOVA was applied to obtain a p value for
the Seeing × Congruency interaction effect. We repeated
the simulations 1,000 times for sample sizes ranging from
N = 10 to N = 50, and stored the power to detect a sig-
nificant interaction effect at p < .05. For d', 80% power
was obtained at a sample size of N = 45; for criterion,
80% power was obtained at a sample size of N = 20. We
collected data from N = 46 subjects in Experiment 3.
Participants Forty-six participants (28 females, mean age = 26
years, SD = 8.82, range: 18–65 years) took part in Experiment 3.
Nine participants were excluded with the same exclusion criteria
as in Experiments 1 and 2, leaving 37 for analysis (27 females;
mean age = 24.35 years, SD = 5.97, range: 18–47 years).
Stimuli and procedure The same stimuli and procedure
were used as in Experiment 2, with an additional condi-
tion: In half of the trials, the avatar was blindfolded.
Participants were instructed that the blindfolded avatar
would not be able to see the stimuli. Experiment 3 thus
comprised seven blocks of 96 trials in a fully factorial
design crossing perspective = self/other, avatar direction
= left/right, stimulus position = left/right, Gabor = pres-
ent/absent, and blindfold = seeing/nonseeing (Fig. 3a).
The correct response on Bother^ trials was determined by
whether or not the avatar was able to see the Gabor. Thus,
in all nonseeing Bother^ trials, the correct answer was a
BNo^ response.
Data preprocessing Data of Experiment 3 were preprocessed
in the same way as for Experiments 1 and 2. A mean of 5.3
trials per subject were excluded.
Signal-detection analysis Similar to Experiment 2, responses
on Bself^ trials were sorted into hits, false alarms, misses and
correct rejections. For each subject, detection sensitivity (d')
and criterion (c) were calculated separately for each cell of the
2 (seeing, nonseeing) × 2 (congruent, incongruent) factorial
design. We nested the hierarchical SDT model inside a linear
regression model that encoded the two factors of our experi-
mental design (Blindfold × Congruence), plus their interac-
tion. Thus each subject’s d' parameter was specified as:
d′ ¼ d′base þ βc*Ic þ βb*Ib þ βi*Ic*Ib
where Ic and Ib are indicator variables that are equal to 1 when
the condition is congruent/seeing and 0 otherwise, and βc, βb
and βi are regression coefficients encoding the effects of con-
gruency, blindfold and their interaction, respectively.
Uninformative (high variance) priors on these influences on
d'were specified as follows (after JAGS convention, variances
are written as precisions, or the reciprocal of variance):
d
0
base∼N 0; 0:001ð Þ
βc∼N 0; 0:001ð Þ
βb∼N 0; 0:001ð Þ
βi∼N 0; 0:001ð Þ
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Analogous regression parameters and priors were applied
to estimate the influence of each experimental factor on the
criterion, c.
Results
Boosts in perceptual sensitivity are dependent on shared
perception
In Experiment 3, due to the added complexity of the design,
we increased the trial number (672 trials per subject) and
doubled our sample size to ensure sufficient power (see
Experiment 3, Method, for details). Focusing on the critical
Bself^ trials in which the avatar’s perspective was irrelevant
for the detection judgment, we quantified the influence of
these factors and their interaction on SDT parameters d' and c.
Both congruency (Pθ = .77) and blindfold (Pθ = .84) en-
gendered positive effects on d' such that greatest perceptual
sensitivity was observed in the seeing, congruent condition
(leftmost bar in left panel of Fig. 3b). Critically, these main
effects were qualified by a significant Congruency × Blindfold
interaction (see Fig. 3b–c; Pθ = .99) due to congruent (vs.
Fig. 3 a Schematic of trials in the different conditions of Experiment 3. In
the nonseeing conditions, the avatar wore a blindfold. This factor was
crossed in a fully factorial design with perspective, congruency, and
Gabor presence. b Mean d′, criterion, and response times for Bself^
trials in Experiment 3. Symbols indicate the significance of paired t
tests (*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001). Error bars indicate SEM (N =
37). c Posterior densities of estimated regression coefficients for the
effects of congruency, blindfold, and their interaction on perceptual
sensitivity (d′) and bias (criterion). Vertical line indicates the zero point.
(Colour figure online)
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incongruent) avatar perspectives boosting d' in the seeing con-
dition, t(36) = 2.93, p = .006, but not the nonseeing condition,
t(36) = 0.56, p = .58. For detection criterion, Bayesian analy-
ses presented weaker support for either main effects or inter-
actions (centre panel of Fig. 3b; congruency, Pθ = .72; blind-
fold, Pθ = .66; Congruency × Blindfold interaction, Pθ = .93).
Finally, examining response times, we observed significant
speeding by congruent perspectives in both seeing and
nonseeing conditions (thus tracking the low-level directional
features of the avatar),F(1, 36) = 9.64, p = .004, in the absence
of a main effect of blindfold, F(1, 36) = 2.63, p = .11, nor a
Congruency × Blindfold interaction, F(1, 36) = 2.74, p = .60.
Thus, response times, unlike perceptual sensitivity, were mod-
ulated by spatial congruency but were insensitive to shared
perception.
In summary, the results of Experiment 3 provide evidence
that the effects of the avatar on visual sensitivity are gated by
beliefs about shared perception, and are not explained by low-
level directional features which remained constant in the see-
ing and nonseeing conditions.
BOther^ Condition
The previous analyses focused on the critical Bself^ condition,
in which the avatar was irrelevant for the perceptual response
to the Gabor. In classic dot perspective tasks, the Bother^ con-
dition is also of interest and used to measure whether
Begocentric interference^ affects judgements from the avatar’s
perspective. This effect manifests as lower accuracy and
slower response times in the incongruent versus congruent
trials (Samson et al., 2010). We were unable to conduct a
similar analysis here due to the detection task creating imbal-
ances in this condition—in three-quarters of Bother^ trials
(Gabor-present-incongruent, Gabor-absent-congruent, and
Gabor-absent-incongruent), a BNo^ response is the correct
answer. Only on congruent-Gabor-present trials is BYes^ the
correct answer. We suspect that this feature of the Bother^
condition led subjects to adopt a conservative criterion such
that they were more likely to say BNo^, leading to faster RTs
and higher accuracy for Bincongruent^ trials (where BNo^ is
always the correct answer, regardless of Gabor presence).
Indeed, in Experiment 1, performance was higher overall
on the Bother^ compared with Bself^ condition (main effect of
perspective), F(1, 9) = 37.89, p < .001, including between
Gabor-absent Bother^ and Gabor-absent Bself^ trials (see
Fig. 1b), t(9) = 2.41, p = .04. The same effect on accuracy
was observed in Experiment 2—an overall higher accuracy in
Bother^ compared with Bself^ trials (main effect of perspec-
tive), F(1, 17) = 41.76, p < .001, as well as in Gabor-absent
Bother^ compared with Gabor-absent Bself^ trials (see Fig.
2b), t(17) = 6.41, p < .001. Experiment 2 now also exhibited
response time effects that were previously insignificant in
Experiment 1. Response times were overall faster in the
Bother^ than in the Bself^ condition (main effect of perspec-
tive, F(1, 17) = 26.71, p < .001, with Gabor-absent Bother^
trials having faster responses times than those in the Gabor-
absent Bself^ trials (see Fig. 2b), t(17) = −5.56, p < .001.
Additionally, Bother^ Gabor-present-incongruent trials also
exhibited higher accuracy, t(17) = 6.62, p < .001;
Perspective × Congruency interaction, F(1, 17) = 55.59, p <
.001, and faster reaction times, t(17) = −2.30, p = .03;
Perspective × Congruency interaction, F(1, 17) = 7.75, p =
.01, compared with Gabor-present-congruent trials. Together,
these findings suggest that subjects adopted a conservative
criterion on Bother^ trials, and treated BNo^ as the default
response.
Notably, this effect on Bother^ trial accuracy was only pres-
ent in the seeing condition of Experiment 3 (which shows
similar imbalances in response requirements as Experiment
2) and not in the nonseeing condition (see Supplementary
Materials’ Fig. S2), congruent-seeing versus incongruent-see-
ing), t(36) = 7.59, p < .001; congruent-nonseeing versus in-
congruent-nonseeing, t(36) = 1.82, p =.07. In the nonseeing
condition, the correct answer on Bother^ trials was always
BNo^, perhaps explaining the very high accuracy observed
in this condition and the limited effects of stimulus
congruency.
To directly assess whether participants adopted a conserva-
tive criterion on Bother^ trials, we performed an additional
SDT analysis. Responses in the Bother^ congruent
(Experiment 2) or congruent-seeing (Experiment 3) trials were
sorted into hits, false alarms, misses, and correct rejections.
For each subject, detection sensitivity (d') and criterion (c)
were calculated for congruent trials in Experiment 2, and for
the congruent-seeing cell of the factorial design in Experiment
3. SDT analysis was not applicable to the incongruent trials of
Experiment 2 or the incongruent-seeing/all nonseeing condi-
tions of Experiment 3. This is because in these trial types, the
correct answer is a BNo^ response despite the Gabor some-
times being present or absent, and thus standard SDT classifi-
cations of responses do not apply.
Notably, the criterion estimated in the congruent(-seeing)
condition (see Fig. S4 in the SupplementaryMaterials) in both
Experiments 2 and 3 was conservative (positive), confirming
that participants were biased towards responding BNo^ when
they were asked to judge the stimulus from the avatar’s per-
spective. We surmise that this prior expectation that a BNo^
response will be required (which is appropriate, given the
unbalanced design) is likely to have led to higher correct re-
jection rates on the incongruent (and nonseeing) condition(s)
(see Fig. S2 in the Supplementary Materials), resulting in the
higher accuracy and response times observed in incongruent
versus congruent trials, as well as the higher overall accuracy
and response times observed in the Bother^ versus Bself^
condition.
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General discussion
Previous work has shown that the perspective of others in-
terferes with one’s own judgments and decisions (Cole et al.,
2015; Furlanetto et al., 2016; Qureshi et al., 2010; Samson
et al., 2010; Wiese et al., 2012), consistent with an automatic
process that represents the viewpoint and potential goals of
others (Gallotti & Frith, 2013; Tuomela, 2006). Here, we ask
whether social cueing also leads to shifts in visual process-
ing. We found across three experiments that participants
were more likely to (accurately) detect a near-threshold vi-
sual stimulus from their own perspective when the avatar
could also see the Gabor. By introducing spatially localized
null (noise-only) trials into Experiment 2, we showed this
effect is driven by an increase in detection sensitivity (d')—
an increase in hit rate, without a change in false alarm rate.
Finally, by Bblindfolding^ the avatar in Experiment 3, we
manipulated beliefs about whether the avatar is able to see
while leaving the directional features of the avatar constant.
We showed that the effect of the avatar on perceptual sensi-
tivity is only obtained when the participant believed the av-
atar could also see the Gabor.
Our findings cannot be ascribed to decisional or response
interference because a change in performance was only ob-
served on Gabor-present Bself^ trials (Bhits^), and response
times did not mirror the effect of congruency on sensitivity.
Indeed, in Experiment 3, response times were significantly
speeded by congruent perspectives in both seeing and
nonseeing conditions (thus tracking the low-level directional
features of the avatar, consistent with recent findings; Cole,
Atkinson, Le, & Smith, 2016; Conway, Lee, Ojaghi, Catmur,
& Bird, 2017), whereas a boost in perceptual sensitivity was
only observed in the seeing condition. Taken together, our
findings suggest the avatar’s viewpoint modulates early per-
ceptual processing, thereby potentiating perception of stimuli
for which others are also able to see and act upon (Otten, Seth,
& Pinto, 2017; Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis, 2010).
The mechanism by which shared perception translates to
enhanced perceptual sensitivity remains to be determined. An
appealing hypothesis is that the avatar’s viewpoint acts as an
attentional cue to prioritise particular spatial locations (Otten
et al., 2017), thereby leading to top-down potentiation of per-
ceptual sensitivity. The presence or absence of the blindfold
may in turn modulate the reliability of this prior (Summerfield
& Egner, 2009). However, it remains uncertain which
amongst a broad class of attentional mechanisms that result
in increased signal-to-noise ratio of sensory processing are
altered by shared perception (Luo & Maunsell, 2015; Smith
& Ratcliff, 2009). For instance, shared perception may boost
signal, suppress internal noise, or both. Our findings lay the
foundations for a computational and neural understanding of
how social context affects perceptual processing—for in-
stance, through application of noise-perturbation analyses
(Lu & Dosher, 1998; Wyart et al., 2012) and/or pitting shared
perception against manipulations of signal probability and rel-
evance (Summerfield & Egner, 2009).
Notably, the modulation of perception by the avatar was
abolished by a simple blindfold manipulation. This weakens
explanations of a sensit ivi ty change in terms of
Bsubmentalizing^, in which directional cues bias attention ir-
respective of the observer’s belief about whether the avatar
can also see the target (Furlanetto et al., 2016; Heyes, 2014;
Santiesteban, Catmur, Hopkins, Bird, & Heyes, 2014).
However, we acknowledge that the blindfold may act to abol-
ish automatic gaze following without requiring a belief about
seeing to be instantiated. We think this is less likely, given that
in all conditions, the participant was not able to see the ava-
tar’s eyes, and was instead required to track (via the presence
of the blindfold) whether they are in a seeing or nonseeing
condition. To rule out bottom-up effects of the blindfold, fu-
ture experiments could employ a belief induction manipula-
tion in which the avatar wears either Bseeing^ or Bnonseeing^
coloured goggles (Conway et al., 2017). This ensures that the
visual features of the avatars remain similar allowing changes
in sensitivity to be directly attributed to the participant’s belief
about whether the goggles allow seeing or not (Heyes, 2014).
We also considered the extent to which perceptual sensitiv-
ity effects observed in the Bself^ condition was because of
interference from the Bother^ condition owing to Bself^ and
Bother^ perspective trials being interleaved. Previous work in
the perspective-taking literature has attempted to remove this
possible interference by performing the dot perspective task in
a wholly self-perspective condition (Samson et al., 2010).
However, in noninterleaved designs, participants may perform
the task without explicitly attributing a Bperspective^ to the
avatar. Given the current controversy over the automaticity
and social specificity of visual perspective-taking effects in
decision-making (Cole et al., 2016; Conway et al., 2017;
Furlanetto et al., 2016; Santiesteban et al., 2014), we defer this
issue of the conditions that enable or disable such interference
effects to future study. Instead, we make a more modest claim
that when people are engaged in perspective taking (perhaps
induced by interleaved trials), their perceptual sensitivity is
altered on Bself^ trials. However, we were able to establish
that the effect of the avatar on self-perceptual sensitivity was
equally strong following both Bself^ and Bother^ perspective
trials (see Supplementary Materials and Fig. S5)—thus, at
least ruling out local task-switching or carryover effects as
possible explanations of our results.
Lastly, we sought to understand the pattern of results ob-
tained on Bother^ trials, in which the stimulus was judged
from the avatar’s perspective. In the perspective-taking litera-
ture, participants typically find it more difficult to make judge-
ments from the avatar’s perspective when what the avatar sees
conflicts with their own perspective, supporting an egocentric
interference effect (Samson et al., 2010). We were unable to
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make a similar inference here due to the detection task creating
imbalances in this condition, such that three-quarters of
Bother^ trials required a BNo^ response, and limiting the ex-
tent to which the Bother^ condition can be straightforwardly
compared to the Bself^ condition. Instead, we observed that
participants were overall more efficient in detecting whether a
Gabor was present or absent from the avatar’s perspective.We
reasoned this was due to participants adopting a conservative
criterion (a bias towards saying BNo^) which was advanta-
geous for performing judgments from the avatar’s perspective.
Debates about the automaticity or social specificity of vi-
sual perspective taking typically focus on response times to
clearly visible stimuli as the main dependent measure. Here,
we go beyond these studies to reveal a selective effect of
shared perception on perceptual sensitivity to low-contrast
targets, in the absence of reliable changes in response times.
Because socially dependent shifts in perception may not be
readily apparent to observers via introspection, they may only
become evident in controlled laboratory settings that permit
psychophysical measurement. Future studies of the mecha-
nisms supporting implicit mentalizing may wish to employ
measures of perceptual sensitivity in addition to response
times to provide a richer testing ground for competing theo-
ries. Furthermore, in our current experimental paradigm, we
only probed visual detection in one constant location within
each section of two halves of a 3-D room—future studies may
attempt to investigate changes in perceptual sensitivity across
the whole visual field.
Though it seems counterintuitive that social cognition
should affect our perception of the world, others’ perception
of a stimulus represents a powerful informational resource. In
particular, a Bwe-mode^ of processing has been suggested to
filter stimuli based on whether they are in the vicinity of an-
other individual and available for potential action, thus be-
coming relevant to the group’s goals (Gallotti & Frith, 2013;
Tuomela, 2006). Our results shed new light on how social
context leads to such changes in information processing, by
shaping the sensitivity of early perceptual processes. To con-
clude, we reveal that shared perception enhances visual sen-
sitivity. On this view, our perception of the world is not self-
contained, but is in fact continually affected by what others
can see.
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